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THE SUPREME COURT AND LOCAL
REAPPORTIONMENT: VOTER INEQUALITY IN
SPECIAL-PURPOSE UNITS
PHILIP L. MARTmn*
In recent years new forms of local government have been created to
meet the demands of an increasing population for new governmental
services and efficient allocation of limited resources. Faced with these
political developments, the courts have been called upon to decide
whether the states may experiment with malapportioned units of gov-
ernment designed to deal with specific problems affecting some interests
in a community more than others.
In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District' and
in a per curiam opinion in Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Water-
shed Improvement District2 based on the decision in Salyer Land Co., the
Supreme Court upheld statutes authorizing disproportionate representa-
tion on the governing bodies of special districts. Decided on the grounds
that such districts do not perform general public services and that their
activities have a disproportionate effect on a recognizable group of indi-
viduals under the districts' jurisdictions, these cases present a further
refinement in the Court's development of principles of apportionment
for units of local government.
Salyer Land Co. involved the method of organization of a water
storage district pursuant to the California Water Storage District Act.3
Such districts are empowered to formulate plans "for the acquisition,
appropriation, diversion, storage, conservation, and distribution of
water .... ,, 4 To effectuate its plans, a district may "acquire, improve,
and operate" facilities for the storage and distribution of water and any
necessary drainage or reclamation works.; It may fix rates for the use
* B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute; M.A., Ph.D., University of North Carolina.
Professor of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
1. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
2. 410 U.S. 743 (1973).
3. CAL. WATV R CODE §§ 39000-48401 (West 1966). The Associated Enterprises de-
cision (see note 14 infra) also involved a special district created for the purpose of
water management. The Supreme Court described the problems of adequate water
supplies faced by the western states in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Port-
land Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 156-57 (1935), and in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Brad-
Icy, 164 U.S. 112, 151-54 (1896).
4. CAL. WATER CODE § 42200 (West 1966).
5. Id. § 43000. Such districts are also empowered to generate and distribute hydro-
electric power. Id. § 43025.
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of water and collect fees from those benefiting therefrom in proportion
to the services rendered.6 Costs of a project are assessable against the
land in proportion to the benefits a given tract receives from the project.7
Management of a district is by a board of directors, each director
being elected from a division within the district." Only landowners are
entitled to vote in district general elections,' and a landowner may vote
in each division of the district in which he owns land. Moreover, votes
are apportioned according to assessed valuation of the land.' ° As a result,
residents of a district not holding title to any land therein have no say
in the management of the district; landowners have a voice only to the
extent of their holdings.
The Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District consists of 193,000
acres of highly fertile, intensively cultivated land and has a population
of 77 persons, including 18 children. Eighty-five percent of its land is
owned by four corporations which employ most of the residents. The
remaining acreage is divided among 189 other landowners who possess
up to 80 acres each. The system of vote allocation provides the J. G.
Boswell Co. with sufficient votes to dominate the administration of
district functions by having its interests represented by a majority of
the board of directors.'"
For a number of years the minority landowners in the district evi-
dently were content with the imbalance of political power. A conflict
of interests followed by a natural disaster, however, led to the constitu-
tional challenge of the franchise restriction in the special district. Al-
though the policy of the Tulare district for many years had been to
store flood waters downstream in the Buena Vista Lake, the board of
directors, dominated by the J. G. Boswell Co., in 1969 rejected con-
tinuation of the policy. As a result, 88,000 of the 193,000 acres in the
Tulare Lake Basin were inundated by flood waters. According to the
plaintiffs, the reason behind the board's decision to change a successful
practice was that the "J. G. Boswell Co. had a long term agricultural
6. Id. § 43006.
7. Id. H§ 46175-46176.
8. Id. §§ 40658, 39929.
9. "Only the holders of title to land are entitled to vote at a general election." Id.
S 41000.
10. 'Each voter . . . may cast one vote for each one hundred dollars ($100), or
fraction thereof, worth of his land ... in the precinct." Id. § 41001.
11. 410 U.S. at 735 (dissenting opinion). The position of the J. G. Boswell Co. is
so strong that at the time the suit was filed there had been no election since 1947, the
outcome being a foregone conclusion. Id.
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lease in the Buena Vista Lake Basin and flooding it would have inter-
fered with the planting, growing, and harvesting of crops the next
season." 2
The statutory provision restricting the franchise in district elections
to landowners was challenged on the ground that nonlandowning resi-
dents have as much interest in the activities of the district as land-
owners, especially since most of the landowners are not residents. Sup-
port for the argument for equal representation was found generally in
Reyntolds v. Si7&3 and the series of local reapportionment cases which
followed it and specifically in Supreme Court decisions invalidating state
laws which restricted the franchise to landowners. A brief discussion
of these decisions is essential to appreciation of the Court's rationale in
rejecting the challenge to the Tulare vote allocation scheme. 4
In 1967 the Supreme Court decided two cases involving local repre-
sentation without establishing the extent to which the "one person, one
12. Id. at 737 (dissenting opinion).
13. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Reynolds was decided two years after the Court's land-
mark ruling in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), that apportionment suits are justici-
able under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The decision in
Baker, however, did not delineate the degree of malapportionment the Court con-
sidered unconstitutional. The "one man, one vote" principle, hereinafter referred to
as "one person, one vote" (see Wells v. Edwards, 93 S. Ct. 904 (1973) (dissenting
opinion)), was announced as the appropriate standard for apportionment of congres-
sional districts in Vesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). The Court in Reynolds
held the same standard applicable to apportionment of state legislative districts.
For discussions of early post-Reynolds decisions, see Weinstein, The Effect of the
Federal Reapportionment Decision on Counties and Other Fornm of Municipal Govern-
ments, 65 COLuM. L. Riv. 953 (1967); 53 VA. L. REv. 953 (1967). In apparently the
first local reapportionment case decided after Reynolds, a county court in Michigan
provided what was to become a typical statement of strict adherence to the "one
person, one vote" principle in local reapportionment cases: "The State may exercise
its legislative powers only in a legislative body apportioned on a population basis and
if it delegates a part of those powers, it must do so to a legislative body apportioned
to the same 'basic constitutional standard."' Brouwer v. Bronkema, No. 1855 (Cir.
Cr., Kent County, Mich., Sept. 11, 1964), aff'd by an equally divided court, 377 Mich.
616, 141 N.V17.2d 98 (1966). See 13 NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, CoURT DEcIsIoNs
ON Lrisr.i' RE-APPORTIONMIENT 81, 95 (1964).
14. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S.
743 (1973), decided the same day as Salyer Land Co., involved the identical issue and
was the subject of a per curiam opinion. The Toltec district, organized pursuant to
the Wyoming Watershed Improvement District Act, Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-354.1 to
-354.26 (Supp. 1973), exercised the same powers as the Tulare district and was organ-
ized for effectuation of, and engaged in, the same activities. For these reasons the
Court held that its Salyer Land Co. decision controlled in excepting Toltec district
elections from requirements of equal per capita apportionment.
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vote"15 standard announced in Reynolds for apportionment of state
legislatures would be applied to governmental subdivisions below the
state level.' 6 The rulings, nevertheless, established some guidelines which
proved important in later decisions.
Sailors v. Board of Education 7 involved a Michigan statute' permit-
ting selection of members of county school boards by delegates, one of
whom was sent from each district school board in the county. Despite
disparate populations in the local districts ranging from 99 to 201,777,
the Court upheld the statute, noting that the county boards were ap-
pointed instead of directly elected and that their duties were principally
nonlegislative in nature.' 9
Of greater significance was the Court's decision in Duseb v. Davis."0
To provide equitable representation for the diverse interests existing
within the city of Virginia Beach, Virginia, following the city's consoli-
dation with an adjoining county, a plan was formulated by which each
voter cast ballots for one councilman from each of seven boroughs and
for four at-large members. Notwithstanding the great disparity in the
sizes of the boroughs, the Court upheld the plan as analogous to a
Georgia plan it previously had declared valid.2' The Dusch Court
reasoned that the boroughs were used merely for purposes of residency,
not representation. Crucial was the fact that the "Seven-Four Plan"
was not a scheme to avoid the ramifications of reapportionment or to
perpetuate incumbents in office. Moreover, the scheme did not result in
disproportionate representation and made "no distinction on the basis
of race, creed, or economic status or location."22
15. See note 13 supra.
16. Two other cases in 1967 were remanded by the Court because of jurisdictional
errors in using three-judge federal courts when the challenged laws were not of state-
wide application. Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967) (Alabama administrative
board); Board of Supervisors v. Bianchi, 387 U.S. 97 (1967) (New York county board
of supervisors).
17. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
18. MIci. STAT. AaN. § 15.3294(1) (Supp. 1965).
19. 387 U.S. at 110. The Court stated that as long as the procedure does not violate
a federally protected right, state or local administrative officials may be chosen "by
the governor, by the legislature, or by some other appointive means rather than by an
election." Id. at 108. It reserved, however, the question "whether a State may consti-
tute a local legislative body through the appointive rather than the elective process."
Id. at 109-10.
20. 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
21. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965) (state senate).
22. 387 U.S. at 115.
[Vol. 15:601
LOCAL REAPPORTIONMENT
Neither Sailors nor Duscb decided the ultmate issue of the applica-
bility of Reynolds to apportionment of local governments. In Sailors
the Court reserved the question whether the apportionment of local
legislative bodies is governed by Reynolds, and in Duseb it stated only
that if Reynolds controls, "the constitutional test under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is whether there is an 'invidious' discrimination" embodied
in the apportioning provision2 3
The applicability of the Reynolds doctrine to local governments was
answered partially the following year in Avery v. Midland County,"'
which involved the selection of four county commissioners representing
districts with widely varying populations. Relying upon its precedents
protecting against the dilution of votes in state legislative elections, the
Supreme Court extended the principle of "one person, one vote" to local
government bodies of general powers.',
In justifying its decision consolidating state and local governments in
the same constitutional category, the Court emphasized:
The Equal Protection Clause reaches the exercise of state power
however manifested, whether exercised directly or through sub-
divisions of the State .... Although the forms and functions of
local government and the relationships among the various units
are matters of state concern, it is now beyond question that a
State's political subdivisions must comply with the Fourteenth
Amendment. The actions of local government are the actions of
the State. A city, town, or county may no more deny the equal
protection of the laws than it may abridge freedom of speech,
23. ld. at 116.
24. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
25. A major legal obstacle to this ruling was U.S. CoNsr. amend. X, which implicitly
recognizes a unitary relationship between a state government and its subdivisions. Sig-
nificantly, a reaffirmation of this constitutional position was made in one of the first
reapportionment cases:
Political subdivisions of States-counties, cities, or whatever-never were
and never have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have
been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities
created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental
functions. As stated by the Court in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207
U.S. 161, 178, . . . these governmental units are "created as convenient
agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as
may be entrusted to them," and the "number, nature and duration of the
powers conferred upon [them] . . . and the territory over which they
shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state."
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).
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establish an official religion, arrest without probable cause, or
deny due process of law.26
Noting that the states generally delegate power only to instrumentali-
ties with a representative form of government, the Court concluded that
there is "little difference, in terms of the application of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and of the principles of Reynolds v. Sims, between the
exercise of state power through legislatures and its exercise by elected
officials in the cities, towns, and counties."
27
The Avery Court, however, was careful to preserve the Dusch and
Sailors caveat that states should be allowed substantial latitude in "de-
vising mechanisms of local government suitable for local needs and
efficient in solving local problems." 28 Noting that the Midland County
Commissioners Court 9 exercises roughly the same powers as those
vested in all elective governments of general powers,30 the Court ob-
served: "Were the Commissioners Court a special-purpose unit of gov-
ernment assigned the performance of functions affecting definable
groups of constituents more than other constituents, we would have to
confront the question whether such a body may be apportioned in ways
which give greater influence to the citizens most affected by the organi-
zation's functions.""' Thus deferring for later resolution the question
26. 390 U.S. at 479-80 (foomote omitted). The Court indicated that although a state
legislature is apportioned correctly, elected local governing bodies are not thereby
exempted from the force of the fourteenth amendment, observing: 'While state legis-
latures exercise extensive power over their constituents and over the various units of
local government, the States universally leave much policy and decisionmaking to their
governmental subdivisions." Id. at 481.
27. Id. at 481 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 485.
29. Consisting of commissioners elected from districts, this governing body is chaired
by the county judge, who is elected at large and who has only a tie-breaking vote.
Id. at 476.
30. The classification of the commissioners court was based on the following inter-
pretation:
[T]he court does have power to make a large number of decisions having
a broad range of impacts on all the citizens of the county. It sets a tax
rate, equalizes assessments, and issues bonds. It then prepares and adopts a
budget for allocating the county's funds, and is given by statute a wide
range of discretion in choosing the subjects on which to spend. In adopt-
ing the budget the court makes both long-term judgments about the way
Midland County should develop-whether industry should be solicited,
roads improved, recreation facilities built, and land set aside for schools-
and immediate choices among competing needs.
Id. at 483.
31. Id. at 483-84.
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of apportionment of special-purpose government bodies, the implication
that such units would be permitted to experiment with more flexible
electoral designs was underscored by the Court's statement that "the
Constitution imposes one ground rule for the development of arrange-
ments of local government: a requirement that units with general gov-
ernmental powers over an entire geographic area not be apportioned
among single-member districts of substantially unequal population." 32
Further significant development of principles of local apportionment
resulted from the Court's decision in Hadley v. Junior College District,"3
involving the method of election of trustees for a Missouri junior college
district. Under the statutory scheme,3 4 one of the units of the district,
although containing 60 percent of the total school enumeration,3" was
entitled to elect only three of the six trustees. While noting that the
powers of the junior college district trustees were "not fully as broad"
as those of the commissioners court in Avery, the Court held that such
powers were "general enough and have sufficient impact throughout the
district to justify" application of the "one person, one vote" principle.3
In the Court's attempt to delineate the extent to which Reynolds
applies to local governments, it was emphasized that the decision by a
state to make a local office elective indicates the importance of that
office to the community at large. Accordingly, the Court enunciated
the following "general rule":
[XV]henever a state or local government decides to select persons
by popular election to perform governmental functions, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each
qualified voter must be given an equal opportunity to participate
32. ld. at 485-86 (emphasis supplied). The effect of the decision in Avery was
limited, since only about 25 percent of local governing bodies are chosen from dis-
tricts. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 110, Sailors v. Board of Edu-
cation, 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
33. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
34. The statute provided that if none of the electoral units in the district had at least
one-third of the total population in the district between the ages of six and 20 years
(defined as the "school enumeration"), then all trustees were to be chosen at large. If
a district contained between one-third and one-half of the school enumeration, it would
elect two trustees, the remainder being chosen at large. A unit containing between
one-half and two-thirds of the district's school enumeration, as did the unit in Hadley,
elected three trustees, while a unit with more than two-thirds of the school enumera-
tion selected four trustees; in both cases, the balance of the six trustees were chosen
at large.
35. See note 34 supra.
36. 397 US. at 54-55.
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in that election, and when members of an elected body are chosen
from separate districts, each district must be established on a basis
that will insure, as far as is practicable, that equal numbers of voters
can vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials.37
This seemingly sweeping statement was qualified, however, in several
respects. Most significant for purposes of the present discussion was the
Court's speculation that "there might be some case in which a State
elects certain functionaries whose dudes are so far removed from normal
governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different groups
that a popular election in compliance with Reynolds ... might not be
required .... The types of government units falling within this cate-
gory and the amount of deviation which would be constitutionally per-
missible were not specified.3 9 Using the Missouri Junior College District
as an example, however, the Court excluded education from the hypo-
thetical exception, noting that "[e] ducation has traditionally been a vital
governmental function, and these trustees, whose election the State has
opened to all qualified voters, are governmental officials in every rele-
vant sense of that term." 40
37. Id. at 56.
38. Id.
39. Although disagreeing with the decision of the majority as an unwarranted exten-
sion of the "one person, one vote" requirement, Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, also
faulted the majority for failing to delineate more clearly when an exception to its
"general rule" is appropriate, stating: "[Tihe Court has given almost no indication of
which nonpopuation interests may or may not legitimately be considered by a legis-
liture in devising a constitutional apportionment scheme for a local, specialized unit
of government. Id. at 70-71.
40. Id. at 56. The Court further qualified its "general rule" by reaffirming the rule an-
nounced in Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967), that combining an at-large election
with a requirement that candidates be residents of certain districts of unequal popula-
tion does not violate principles of equal representation. Id. at 58. (See notes 20-22
supra & accompanying text). Also afforded recognition was the holding in Sailors v.
Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967), that if officials are appointed, and such ap-
pointment does not itself offend the Constitution, the fact that the officials "represent"
different numbers of individuals does not make the system invalid. Id. (See notes
17-19 supra & accompanying text). Finally, the Court reiterated the statement in
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964), that mathematical exactness is not required
so long as there is no systematic discrimination. Id.
In Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), the Court considered a plan for reapportion-
ing a county board of supervisors, which traditionally had been composed of officials
from the five townships located in the county. The plan called for the smallest town
to be allotted one board member, the population of that town then being divided into
that of each of the other towns to determine the number of board members they
would elect. Uneven quotients were rounded to the nearest integer. Despite a total
(Vol. 15:601
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Before the challenge to the scheme of representation used in the Tulare
Vater District, the Supreme Court on several occasions had held that
the franchise cannot be restricted to a particular class of voters unless
there exists a state interest which can be best served by the exclusion of
otherwise qualified voters. Kramer v. Union Free School District4' in-
volved a New York statute limiting the franchise in school district
elections to owners or lessees of taxable real property located in the
district, their spouses, and those with children enrolled in the district's
schools. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, stated that in the
absence of a "compelling state interest" -12 otherwise qualified voters
could not be denied the right to vote in district elections. Although the
Court found such interest lacking in this instance, it left open the possi-
bility that in a situation where some individuals were affected by the
outcome of an election and the activities of the local government more
than others, a voting plan limiting the franchise to those "primarily
affected" might be held valid.43
In Cipriano v. City of Houma,4 the Court, in a per curiam opinion,
invalidated a Louisiana statute restricting to property owners the vote in
elections for the approval of revenue bonds. It was held that non-
property owners were not substantially less affected by the level of
bonding, since the purpose of the bond income was to improve utility
systems serving all local residents. Moreover, since the bonds were to
be repaid from the revenues of the utilities, the burden of repayment
fell upon landowners and nonlandowners alike.45
deviation from equality of 11.9 percent, the Court upheld the plan, primarily because
the "indigenous bias" favoring one geographic area over another, found and condemned
in Hadley, was not present. Id. at 186. The Court noted that the plan did not result
in systematic discrimination in favor of or against any identifiable group or town;
rather, any discrimination resulting from the "rounding off" procedure would be ran-
dom only and hence constitutional. This reasoning was buttressed by the Court's
declaration that the "particular circumstances and needs of a local community as a
whole may sometimes justify departures from strict equality." Id. at 185. Additionally,
"the long history of, and perceived need for, close cooperation between the county
and its constituent towns" and the county's attempt to retain intergovernmental co-
ordination while correcting, to a considerable degree, the severe malapportionment
which had developed in its old system were found to warrant validation of the plan.
Id. at 186.
41. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
42. Id. at 627, 630.
43. 7d. at 632.
44. 395 US. 701 (1969).
45. Id. at 705.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Applying the rationale of Kramer and Cipriano, the Court in Phoenix
v. Kolodziejski6 struck down another statute limiting the franchise to
property owners in elections for the approval of general obligation
bonds. The contention in favor of this method of bond approval stressed
that the burden of servicing the bonds was placed by law on property
owners through property taxes and secured by the general taxing power
of the local government, which in turn relied on property taxes for
most of its revenue. Rejecting the argument that property owners thus
were affected to a significantly greater extent than other residents, the
Court noted that half the debt service would be paid from local reve-
nues other than the property tax and that a significant portion of the
burden of the property tax would be passed along by lessors to tenants. 7
It was held that since all residents were substantially interested and
affected by the public facilities to be funded by the bonds, there was
no compelling state interest for limiting the franchise to property
owners.
In Salyer Land Co., the Court finally identified, in the Tulare Water
Storage District, a unit of local government the powers of which are
sufficiently specific and the activities of which have a sufficiently dis-
proportionate effect upon an identifiable group to warrant application of
the exception, alluded to in Hadley, to the "one person, one vote" re-
quirement. Distinguishing its prior decisions upon which plaintiffs relied,
the Court stated that Cipriano and Phoenix involved local governments
with general governmental powers as defined in Avery and that Kramer
and Hadley extended the Reynolds rule to school districts with powers
which, while not as broad as those of the commissioners court in Avery,
were general enough and had sufficient impact throughout the district
to warrant application of the "one person, one vote" principle imposed
on local governments in Avery.
The Tulare district, in contrast, was found to be a "special-purpose"
government. The Court conceded that the district is vested with some
of the powers normally exercised by governments of general authority,
such as maintaining a staff of professional employees, 8 contracting for
the construction of projects,49 condemning private property for district
use,5 0 cooperating with federal and state agencies,5 ' and incurring in-
46. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
47. Id. at 209-10.
48. CAL. WATER CODE § 43152(c) (West 1966).
49. Id. § 43152(b).
50. Id. §§ 43530=43533.
51. Id. § 43151.
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debtedness through the issuance of bonds . 2 It was emphasized, however,
that the district did not engage in other traditional governmental activi-
ties, such as providing schools, roads, housing, utilities, police and fire pro-
tection, or transportation, nor were there any district subdivisions or
towns to administer these functions. In dismissing the argument that
the district should not be classified as a "special-purpose" government
because its flood control activities affected the entire community, the
Court stated that this responsibility was incidental "to the exercise of
the district's primary functions of water storage and distribution." 53
With respect to the second requirement of the exception suggested in
Hadley to the principle of "one person, one vote," the Court found that
the district's policies and projects have a substantially greater effect
upon landowners than upon nonlandowning residents. It was noted that
the district government is financed by assessing all landowners for
project costs according to the benefit received, and that, similarly, a
cost-benefit ratio is employed to levy charges for services performed by
the district. In addition, delinquent payments result in a lien on the land
involved. The Court determined that these factors conclusively estab-
lished that "there is no way that the economic burdens of district opera-
tions can fall on residents qua residents" and that "the operations of the
districts primarily affect the land within their boundaries." " Thus,
having classified the Tulare Water Storage District as a "special-purpose"
government unit and having determined that its activities have a dis-
proportionate effect on an identifiable group of citizens, the Court
held that "the popular election requirements enunciated by Reynolds...
and succeeding cases are inapplicable.. ... "5
In addition to attacking the land ownership requirement, plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of the weighting of the vote in Tulare
district elections according to land valuation. Their contention was
based on the fact that while some of the smaller landowners had but
52. Id. §§ 44900-45900.
53. 410 U.S. 719, 728-29 n.8 (1973).
54. Id. at 729 (footnote omitted).
55, Id. at 730. The wording of this statement makes it somewhat misleading. Al-
though the strict "one person, one vote" rule was held inapplicable, the general rationale
supporting the Reynolds decision still applied. Thus, in affirming the three-judge lower
court, the Court upheld that tribunal's requirement that the district be reapportioned
to the extent that all of its divisions, each of which elected one board member, contain
land with the same aggregate valuation. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
lVater Storage Dist., 342 F. Supp. 144, 146-47 (1972).
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one vote, the J. G. Boswell Co. had 37,825 votes. 6 To the Court, plain-
tiffs' argument ignored "the realities of water storage district opera-
don." 57 It was noted that the capital cost of the most recent district
project of almost $2,500,000 required an assessment of $13.26 per acre.
A sampling of the levies indicated that the total amount collected from
three landowners, each of whom was entitled by valuation to one vote,
was $46, while the J. G. Boswell Co. paid $817,685. That the burdens
as well as the benefits of district operations were allocated in proportion
to land valuation established to the satisfaction of the Court that the
plan was "rationally based," and hence constitutional.r8
As a further justification for upholding the plan for weighting votes,
the Court observed that the California statutory system affords protec-
tion to minority interests which may be affected by a district's projects.
Any proposed project of a water storage district must be approved by
the state treasurer,"0 who must conduct an independent investigation
and certify a detailed report of the expenses of the project. 0 After a
proposal clears these hurdles, a special election is held in the district;0"
commencement of a project requires approval both by a majority of
the total votes assigned to the landowners and by a majority of the
eligible landowning voters.0 ' The Court stressed that since about 190
of the smallest landowners in the district hold only 2.34 percent of the
land, the requirement of dual majorities makes it possible for those
owning only a small fraction of the district's acreage to defeat projects
they consider contrary to their best interests.63
Admittedly, minority rights can be protected by the stipulation of
the two voting categories for project confirmation; this procedure,
however, does not apply to other matters of equal importance. How,
for example, are disfranchised residents and smaller landowners to protest
decisions detrimental to their interests and properties when the governing
board is dominated by a single large landowner? The events culminating
56. Plaintiffs relied on various Supreme Court rulings that wealth has no relation
to voter qualifications and that the franchise cannot be denied because of any require-
ment utilizing that relationship. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
57. 410 U.S. at 734.
58. Id. at 734-35.
59. CAL. WATR CODE § 42275 (West Supp. 1973).
60. Id. §§ 42275-42280.
61. CAL. WATER CoDE §§ 42325-42332 (West 166).
62. Id. § 42550.
63. 410 U.S. at 723 n.3, 734 n.10.
[ ol. 15:601
LOCAL REAPPORTIONMENT
in the flooding of the Tulare Lake Basin in 1969 illustrate the potential
effects on a majority which has little or no participation in a government
maldng decisions for everyone living or owning land under its jurisdic-
tion. 4 Individual rights clearly are jeopardized by this kind of political
process, and justifying electoral exclusion with economic arguments is
not supported by reason or precedent. Nevertheless, these factors were
prominent in the Supreme Court's opinion that:
Since the subjection of the owners' lands to [assessments] ... was
the basis by which the district was to obtain financing, the pro-
posed district had as a practical matter to attract landowner sup-
port. Nor, since assessments against landowners were to be the
sole means by which the expenses of the district were to be paid,
could it be said to be unfair or inequitable to repose the franchise
in landowners but not residents. Landowners as a class were to
bear the entire burden of the district's costs, and the State could
rationally conclude that they, to the exclusion of residents, should
be charged with responsibility for its operation.65
Mr. Justice Douglas, in dissent, argued the invalidity of the California
scheme of restricted representation on the ground that the state's water
storage districts perform important governmental functions having a
significant impact throughout their territories. Such functions include,
besides those listed by the majority,66 governmental immunity from
suit,0 7 exemption from taxation,' and the power of eminent domain. 69
The dissent stressed, in addition, that one of the responsibilities of the
districts is flood control. Justice Douglas concluded that "[a]s a non-
landownming bachelor was held to be entitled to vote on matters affecting
education,.., so all prospective victims of mismanaged flood control
projects should be entitled to vote in water district elections ...."
If it could be established that the functions of the Tulare district
always have disproportionate effect upon part of the district's electorate,
as in the case of irrigation, the arguments of the majority would have
64. See note 12 supra.
65. 410 US. at 731.
66. See notes 48-52 supra & accompanying text.
67. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 811.2, 815 (West 1966).
68. CAL. WATER CODE § 43508 (West 1966).
69. Id. § 43530.
70. 410 U.S. at 739. The dissent also argued that it is "grotesque to think of
corporations voting within the framework of political representation of people" and
that the result of the Court's decision is to leave intact "a corporate political kingdom
undreamed of by those who wrote our Constitution." Id. at 741-42.
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some merit. It is submitted, however, that when, as occurred in the
Tulare district in 1969, a determination of the governing body dictated
by the interests and effected by the decisive influence of a single land-
owner results in severe damage to the interests of a group which is
effectively disfranchised, the argument for constitutionality pales con-
siderably.
The presence of procedural safeguards, such as those to which the
Court pointed in support of its decision, should not be used to justify
the denial of the right to suffrage to any citizen. Neither dual voting
for project approval nor participation in a public hearing to determine
the administrative feasibility of establishing a new unit of government
are adequate substitutes for the right to vote on policies directly affect-
ing all residents. Although it is arguable whether the Tulare district is
a "general" or "special-purpose" unit of local government, the im-
portance of flood control to all residents of the district, irrespective of
their status as landholders or the extent of their holdings, appears to
demand equal representation in accordance with previous decisions of
the Court.
CONCLUSION
The creation of innovative forms of local government to meet the
demands of society clearly is desirable. Nevertheless, the extent to which
innovation results in disfranchisement of individuals subject to the juris-
diction of a governmental body requires the closest scrutiny. Where
significant interests of a group of citizens can be affected by a govern-
ment without provision for effective representation of such interests, the
policy of innovation must give way to constitutional demands of equal
protection of the laws. In this respect, the decision of the Supreme
Court subjecting residents and minority landowners in the Tulare Water
Storage District to the caprice of a single powerful corporation is a
deluding and disappointing retreat from principles of voter equality.
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